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THE SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENT:
DISAGREEMENT REGARDING THE
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 402(a) "ROLLS ON"
Congress has recognized the need to aid working individuals in ac-
cumulating funds to meet personal consumption needs upon retirement.' Con-
gress traditionally has effectuated the policy of aiding working individuals to
accumulate retirement funds by promulgating tax laws that confer tax
advantages 2 to qualified retirement plan3 participants.4 Participants of non-
I. See H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. I (purpose of pension benefit legislation
is to provide retirement income for workers who have dedicated careers to socially productive
work), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEWS 4670, 4670; H.R. RPt. No. 533, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (purpose of pension benefit legislation includes protecting workers' pension
benefit rights), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4639; see also Freyburger,
Pension Plans-The Philosophy of Section 165(a), 22 TAXEs 60, 60 (1944) (in adopting Revenue
Act of 1942, Congress recognized that small percentage of workers have ability to save adequate
amount of funds for retirement); Rice, Employee Trusts Under the Revenue Act of 1974, 20
TAXES 721, 721 (1942) (Congress' purpose for enacting Revenue Act was to improve welfare of
retiring work force). See generally Brillembourg, The Taxation of Lump Sum Distributions
From Employee Benefit Plans Under Section 402(a)(2), 35 TAX LAw. 1187, 1187-89 (1982)
(discussing historic development of pension tax laws); Hosford, Deferred Compensation: Lump
Sum Distributions from Disqualified Plans, 34 U. FiA. L. REV. 136, 136-46 (1981) (summarizing
development of pension tax laws in United States).
2. See I.R.C. § 404 (West 1985) (allowing employer deduction for contributions to
qualified employee retirement plans); id. § 402(a)(2) (allowing taxpayers to treat retirement plan
distributions as capital gains); id. § 402(a)(5) (allowing taxpayers to rollover retirement plan
distributions to defer tax liability); infra note 3 (discussing requirements that employee retirement
plans must meet to achieve qualified status); infra notes 6-15 and accompanying text (discussing
tax benefits available to qualified employee retirement plan participants).
3. See I.R.C. § 401 (West 1985) (prescribing requirements that employee retirement plan
must meet for Commissioner to deem retirement plan qualified). Section 401(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 (Code) requires that a qualified retirement plan include a trust, which
administers the assets of a stock bonus, pension, or profit sharing plan. Id. § 401(a).
Additionally, the retirement plan employer must operate the retirement plan and related trust
for the exclusive benefit of the employer's employees. Id. The employer also must operate the
retirement plan and related trust for the purpose of distributing the trust assets to the retirement
plan participants or the participants' beneficiaries. Id. § 401(a)(1). The instrument prescribing
the rules for operation of a retirement plan and related trust must prohibit the diversion of
assets to other than retirement plan participants. Id. § 401(a)(2). The retirement plan must allow
participation by all full time employees who have worked with the retirement plan employer
for one year and have reached the age of 25. Id. § 402(a)(3). The retirement plan cannot
discriminate in favor of officers, shareholders, or highly compensated employees. Id. § 401(a)(4).
To achieve qualification, the retirement plan must meet minimum vesting requirements. Id. §
401(a)(7) The retirement plan instrument must prohibit the employer from using forfeited
retirement plan benefits to make retirement plan distributions to other retirement plan partici-
pants. Id. § 401(a)(8). Additionally, the employee must make all required distributions to
retirement plan participants. Id. § 401(a)(9). See generally 4A J. MERTENS, THE LAw oF FEDERAL
INCOME TAxAXiON § 22B.02-20 (rev. ed. 1983 & Supp. 1985) (explaining requirements for
qualification of employee retirement plan); Sollee & Shapiro, Pension Plans-Qualification,
TAX MomT. (BNA) 35 1, at A-6 to A-85 (1985) (analyzing qualification requirements for employee
retirement plans).
4. See S. REP. No. 530, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 314 (legislators recognize importance of
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tax incentives in developing strong pension system), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
781, 1055; Goodman, Legislative Development of the Federal Tax Treatment of Pension and
Profit-Sharing Plans, 49 TAxEs 226, 230 (1971) (tax laws regulating retirement plans encourage
employers to establish retirement plans that provide retirement funds for retired employees);
see also Brillembourg, supra note 1, at 1187-89 (discussing legislative incentives provided through
evolution of pension tax laws); Hosford, supra note 1, at 136-46 (summarizing development of
pension tax laws in United States). See generally J. MERTENS, supra note 3, § 25B.02 (overview
of historical development of pension benefit legislation). Congress first enacted legislation to
aid employees in accumulating retirement funds in the form of the Revenue Act of 1921.
Goodman, supra, at 226. The Revenue Act of 1921 provided an exemption from income tax
for employer and employee contributions to a qualifying stock bonus or profit sharing plan.
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 219(f), 42 Stat. 227, 247. Subsequently, Congress extended the
exemption from income tax to contributions made by employees and employers to pension
plans. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 219(f), 44 Stat. 9, 33.
In 1942 Congress determined that many employers who had adopted employee retirement
plans limited participation in the retirement plans to a small percentage of employees. H.R.
REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 413. Congress perceived
the employers' limitation of employee participation in employee retirement plans as an abuse
of the tax laws. Id. Accordingly, Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1942 (1942 Act), which
required employers to meet participation requirements in order to qualify for the tax exempt
status. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 165, 56 Stat. 798, 862. Congress' purpose in adopting
the participation requirements was to insure that employers operated employee retirement plans
for the welfare of employees in general, and not only for the benefit of officers, shareholders,
and highly paid employees. H.R. REP- No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 104, reprinted in 1942-
2 C.B. 372, 450. The 1942 Act required retirement plan sponsors to include 70% of all full
time employees in a retirement plan to achieve the qualifed status, Revenue Act of 1942, ch.
619, § 165(a)(3)(A), 56 Stat. 798, 862. Additionally, the 1942 Act entitled retirement plan participants
to treat lump sum distributions from qualified retirement plans as capital gains. Revenue Act
of 1942, ch. 619, § 165(b), 56 Stat. 798, 863.
In 1962, Congress enacted legislation to aid self-employed individuals in accumulating
funds for retirement. See Self-Employed Individuals Retirement Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-
792, § 2(d), 76 Stat. 809, 814. The Self-Employed Individuals Retirement Act of 1962 allowed self-
employed individuals to utilize 5 year income averaging when determining tax liability. Id. Subse-
quently, Congress realized that the 5 year income averaging available to self-employed individuals
created a distinction in the tax treatment of self-employed individuals and common law employees.
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 154, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1645, 1806-07. Accordingly, Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which granted an
income averaging provision to employees who receive lump sum distributions from qualified
employee retirement plans. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 668(b), 83 Stat. 487, 595.
In 1974, Congress saw the need to implement safeguards to provide security to participants
of private retirement funds. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4639. Accordingly, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829. ERISA's major provisions established minimum funding
standards, fiduciary reporting requirements, and established requirements for the vesting of
accumulated retirement plan rights. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-8 (describing
ERISA's major provisions), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4643-46.
ERISA also granted favorable tax treatment to qualified employee retirement plan participants
by enacting a rollover provision. See I.R.C. § 402(a)(5) (West 1985) (prescribing requirements
plan must satisfy to utilize rollover provision); infra note 13 (defining rollover of distribution
from employee retirement plan).
In 1981 Congress once again determined that workers needed additional savings mecha-
nisms to prepare for retirement. S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 112, reprinted in 1981
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qualified retirement plans, however, receive no special tax advantages.' Sec-
tion 402(a)' of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code) contains provisions
that confer tax advantages to qualified retirement plan participants.' Section
402(a)(2)9 of the Code allows taxpayers to treat a portion of a lump sum
distribution9 from a qualified retirement plan as a capital gain rather than
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 108, 214. Accordingly, Congress enacted legislation granting
individuals a deduction from gross income for amounts deposited to individual retirement
accounts. See I.R.C. § 219 (prescribing requirements for deductibility of individual retirement
account savings). See generally Bildersee, Encouraging Retirement Savings: Qualified Voluntary
Employee Contributions and Payroll-Based Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 41 INsT. ON FED.
TAX'N § 40.01 (1983) (discussing tax subsidized retirement savings vehicles).
In 1982 Congress enacted the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA).
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324. Through
TEFRA, Congress attempted to equalize the treatment of retirement plans benefiting only
common law employees and retirement plans for self-employed individuals. S. REP. No. 530,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 314, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 781, 1055. TEFRA
reduced the allowable annual contribution an employer could make to an employee retirement
plan and increased the allowable annual contribution an individual could make to a self-
employed retirement plan. Id. at 315. Congress' equalization attempt in TEFRA evolved into
additional limitations on employee retirement plans through the "top heavy" retirement plan
disqualification requirements. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1633, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 697, 1257; see infra notes 168-69 (discussing "top heavy"
employee retirement plan disqualification).
5. See I.R.C. § 402(b) (West 1985) (taxpayer must include employer contributions to
nonqualified employee retirement plan in gross income for year of contribution). See generally
J. MERTENS, supra note 3 § 25B.154 (analyzing effect of Commissioner disqualifying previously
qualified employee retirement plan); Comment, Implementing Policy Objectives in the Taxation
of Deferred Compensation Arrangements, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1460, 1468-73 (discussing rules govern-
ing taxation of nonqualified employee retirement plan participants).
6. I.R.C. § 402(a) (West 1985).
7. See infra notes 8-15 and accompanying text (describing tax advantages of Code §
402(a)).
8. I.R.C. § 402(a)(2) (West 1985). Section 402(a)(2) of the Code provides:
(2) Capital gains treatment for portion of lump sum distributions.-In the case
of an employee trust described in section 401(a), which is exempt from tax under
section 501(a), so much of the total taxable amount (as defined in subparagraph (D)
of subsection (e)(4)) of a lump sum distribution as is equal to the product of such
total taxable amount multiplied by a fraction-
(A) the numerator of which is the number of calendar years of active
participation by the employee in such plan before January 1, 1974, and
(B) the denominator of which is the number of calendar years of active
participation by the employee in such plan,
shall be treated as a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more
than 6 months.
Id. (emphasis added).
9. See id. § 402(e)(4)(A) (defining lump sum distribution for purposes of § 402 of Code).
A lump sum distribution is the distribution or payment of the entire balance of an employee's
interest in a qualified employee retirement plan. Id. Payment of the lump sum distribution must
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ordinary income.10 In addition, section 402(a)(5)" enables qualified retirement
plan participants to defer tax liability on accumulated retirement plan funds.
12
be contingent upon the employee's death, age, separation from service, or disabled status. Id.
See generally J. MEmNs, supra note 3 § 25B.191 (explaining criteria for determining whether
payment or distribution constitutes lump sum distribution).
10. See supra note 8 (quoting language from Code § 402(a)(2)). Congress first allowed
capital gains treatment of lump sum distributions from qualified plans under the Revenue Act
of 1942. See supra note 4 (discussing development of federal tax laws regulating employee
retirement plans). Congress extended capital gain treatment for lump sum distributions to
alleviate a problem that Congress characterized as income bunching. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 154, 155-56, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1806-07.
Income bunching occurs when a taxpayer receives an amount of money, includable in gross
income, which has accumulated over many years. Id.; see Chadwick, Taxation of Certain Lump
Sum Distributions, 28 TAx LAW. 555, 556 (1975) (capital gain treatment mitigates harsh
consequence of receiving large amount of income that accumulated over prolonged period from
participation in employee retirement plan). See generally Brillembourg, supra note I, at 1188
(discussing bunching concept); Hosford, supra note I at 139-40 (same).
11. I.R.C. § 402(a)(5) (West 1985). Section 402(a)(5) of the Code provides:
(5) Rollover amounts.-
(A) General rule.-If-
(i) any portion of the balance to the credit of an employee in a qualified
trust is paid to him,
(ii) the employee transfers any portion of the property he receives in
such distribution to an eligible retirement plan, and
(iii) in the case of a distribution of property other than money, the
amount so transferred, consists of the property distributed,
then such distribution (to the extent so transferred) shall not be includable in
gross income for the taxable year in which paid.
Id. (emphasis added). Section 402(a)(5)(E)(iii) of the Code defines a qualified trust: "(iii)
Qualified trust.-The term 'qualified trust' means an employees' trust described in section
401(a) which is exempt from tax under section 501(a). " Id. § 402(a)(5)(E)(iii) (emphasis added).
To qualify for the rollover treatment, the distribution must either qualify as a lump sum
distribution or result from termination of the retirement plan or from a discontinuance of
contributions to a profit-sharing or stock bonus plan. See id. § 402(a)(5)(E)(i)(I) & (II) (defining
distributions qualifying for rollover treatment). Additionally, a taxpayer must transfer the
qualifying distribution to an eligible retirement plan within 60 days of receipt. Id. § 402(a)(5)(C).
See generally J. MERTENS, supra note 3, § 25B.84 (explaining requirements that taxpayers must
achieve to utilize rollover provision); Lowe, An analysis of New Opportunities for Rollovers of
Distributions from Qualified Plans, 52 J. TAx'N 82, 82-83 (1980) (explaining requirements of
rollover provision); Roche, Developments in Plan-to-Plan Tax-Free Transfers, 7 J. PENSION PLAN
& COMPLIANCE 202, 203 (1981) (identifying when use of rollovers is appropriate).
Congress, in adopting the rollover provision, recognized the highly mobile nature of the
American labor market. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 158, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4670, 4823. Congress concluded that a highly mobile worker could
accumulate vested retirement rights under several employees' retirement plans. Id. Accordingly,
Congress allowed tax free rollovers to permit taxpayers to transfer retirement plan funds to
another retirement plan without incurring tax liability. Id.
12. See Carlson & Schmid, IRA Rollovers Can Defer Income Taxes and, with Trust-
Beneficiary, Save Taxes, 7 ESTATE PLANNING 332, 332 (1980) (rollover provision allows deferral
of tax liability until final distribution); Esterces, When a Rollover or Annuity Option for Plan
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Under section 402(a)(5) of the Code, a taxpayer can rollover'3 any portion
of a distribution from a qualified retirement plan to another eligible retire-
ment plan, 4 without incurring any immediate tax liability.' 5 To qualify for
the special treatment provided by section 402(a)(2) and 402(a)(5), however,
a taxpayer must receive the retirement plan distribution from an employees'
trust'6 "which is exempt from tax."'1
7
The language of Code sections 402(a)(2) and 402(a)(5) expresses clearly
that sections 402(a)(2) and 402(a)(5) entitle taxpayers to the favorable tax
treatment when the employee retirement plan and related employees' trust
meet the relevant qualification requirements at the time of asset distribution. 8
Benefits Should Be Used to Defer Tax, 26 TAx'N FOR ACCT. 72, 72-73 (1981) (participant in
qualified retirement plan can avoid immediate tax liability from lump sum distribution by
utilizing rollover provision); Sacher, How and When a Rollover IRA Should Be Used to Receive
a Lump-Sum Distribution, 24 TAx'N FOR ACCT. 82, 82 (1980) (taxpayers can defer tax liability
on lump sum distributions by effectuating rollover into individual retirement account); Note,
Qualified Plan Distributions: Tax Deferral, ERISA and the IRA, 45 FoRDHM L. REV. 389,
391-96 (1976) (taxpayers may consider rollover of lump sum distributions to avoid taxation in
year of distribution). See generally Blum, An Introduction to the Mathematics of Tax Planning,
57 Txxas 707, 708-09 (1979) (explaining principles underlying benefits of tax liability deferral).
13. See I.R.C. § 402(a)(5) (West 1985) (defining rollover as nontaxable transfer of funds
from qualified retirement plan trust to eligible retirement plan); supra notes 11-12 (discussing
requirements, legislative purpose, and benefits of rollover provision).
14. See I.R.C. § 402(a)(5)(E)(iv) (West 1985) (defining eligible retirement plan as individual
retirement account, individual retirement annuity, qualified trust, and qualifying annuity plan);
id. § 408(a) (defining individual retirement account); id. § 408(b) (defining individual retirement
annuity); id. § 402(a)(5)(E)(iii) (defining qualified trust); id. § 403(a) (defining qualified annuity
plan). See generally Baker, Individual Retirement Arrangements, TAX MOMT. (BNA) 355, A-37
to A-51 (1985) (explaining requirements for obtaining and maintaining qualification of individual
retirement plans created as rollover conduit).
15. See I.R.C. § 402(a)(5) (West 1985) (allowing exclusion from gross income for qualifying
receipts that taxpayer transfers to eligible retirement account); supra notes 11-12 (discussing
requirements, legislative purpose, and benefits of rollover provision).
16. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (West 1985) (defining employee trust as entity formed in United
States, which serves as fiduciary to assets of stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan of
employer).
17. Id. §§ 402(a)(2), 402(a)(5)(E)(iii). Code § 501(a) described the requirement that an
employees' trust must meet to achieve tax exempt status. Id. § 501(a). The Commissioner will
consider an employees' trust exempt from tax if the employees' trust forms a part of a qualified
employee retirement plan under code § 401(a), unless the Commissioner denies the exemption
pursuant to Code sections 502 or 503. Id.; see id. § 401(a) (prescribing qualification requirements
for employee retirement plans); id. § 502 (proscribing tax exempt status for feeder organizations);
id. § 503 (proscribing tax exempt status for entities which engage in prohibited transactions).
Accordingly, the tax exempt status of the employees' trust generally depends on the qualification
status of the related employee retirement plan. See Baetens v. Commissioner, 777 F.2d 1160,
1163 (6th Cir. 1985) (describing relationship between qualification status of employee retirement
plan and tax exempt status of related employees' trust).
18. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (quoting language at issue from Code
sections 402(a)(2) and 402(a)(5)(E)(iii)).
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The language of Code sections 402(a)(2) and 402(a)(5), however, does not
clarify whether assets contributed to a qualified employee retirement plan
lose the favorable tax treatment provided by sections 402(a)(2) and 402(a)(5)
if the retirement plan and related employees' trust subsequently become
nonqualified.19 Federal courts agree that the language, "which is exempt
from tax," contained in both sections 402(a)(2) and 402(a)(5) of the Code is
identical.20 Federal courts, however, do not agree on the proper interpretation
of the language, "which is exempt from tax," contained in sections 402(a)(2)
and 402(a)(5) of the Code .2 Some federal courts interpret the language of
Code sections 402(a)(2) and 402(a)(5) to require that an employee retirement
plan must meet the qualification requirements only at the time of employer
contribution to enable a taxpayer to utilize the favorable tax treatment of
Code sections 402(a)(2) and 402(a)(5).22 Other federal courts interpret the
language of Code sections 402(a)(2) and 402(a)(5) to require that an employee
retirement plan must meet the qualification requirements at the time of
employer contribution and at the time of distribution to enable a taxpayer
to utilize the tax advantages of Code sections 402(a)(2) and 402(a)(5). 23 In
Baetens v. Commissioner,24 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit interpreted the language of Code section 402(a)(5) to require that for
a taxpayer to utilize the favorable tax treatment of Code section 402(a)(5),
a taxpayer must receive a distribution from a retirement plan that meets the




20. See Baetens v. Commissioner, 777 F.2d at 1163 (discussing similarity of language at
issue contained in sections 402(a)(2) and 402(a)(5)(E)(iii)); Cass v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 740,
742 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that pertinent language contained in sections 402(a)(2) and
402(a)(5)(E)(iii) is identical).
21. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (noting courts' differing interpretation
of Code § 402(a)).
22. See, e.g., Greenwald v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 538, 541 (2d Cir. 1966) (Code §
402(a) does not require harsh treatment of denying capital gain rates to distributions attributable
to employer contributions made to qualified retirement plan that Commissioner subsequently
disqualified); Hesse v. Commissioner, 47 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 81-1024, at 1026 (E.D. Mo. 1980)
(Commissioner should allow taxpayers to utilize rollover provision for distributions related to
portion of employer contributions made to qualified employee retirement plan); Boggs v. Com-
missioner, 83 T.C. 132, 152 (1984) (with respect to availability of rollover provision, controlling
consideration is whether employee retirement plan maintained qualified or nonqualified status
in year of employer contribution). See generally Brillembourg, supra note 1, at 1208-11 (discuss-
ing cases that have interpreted Code § 402(a)); Hosford, supra note 1, at 146-51 (same).
23. See, e.g., Cass v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 1985) (§ 402(a)(5)
explicitly limits tax-free rollover to cases in which employee retirement plan maintains qualified
status in year of distribution); Woodson v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1094, 1095 (5th Cir. 1981)
(§ 402(a)(2) clearly restricts capital gain treatment to distribution from employee benefit plan
that Commissioner considers qualified in year of distribution).
24. 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'g 82 T.C. 941 (1984) and 82 T.C. 152 (1984).
25. Id. at 1161.
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In Baetens v. Commissioner, the Sixth Circuit, combined the separate
appeals from two United States Tax Court (Tax Court) cases. 26 The first
case involved a taxpayer, Theodore Baetens, who had worked as an employee
at the time that he filed his 1977 tax return. 27 Baetens' employer maintained
a qualified employee retirement plan. 28 The employer made contributions to
the retirement plan on Baetens' behalf from 1966 through 1973.29 In 1977
the employer terminated the retirement plan and distributed the retirement
plan's assets to the retirement plan participants, including Baetens. 0 Baetens
rolled over his portion of the distribution pursuant to section 402(a)(5) of
the Code.3 In 1979 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner)
retroactively disqualified32 the retirement plan in which Baetens participated
because Baetens' employer failed to allow adequate vesting of employee
retirement benefits.33 Accordingly, the Commissioner considered the retire-
ment plan nonqualified at the time of distribution.34 As a result, the
Commissioner determined that Baetens' distribution did not qualify for a
tax-free rollover under section 402(a)(5) of the Code.35 Accordingly, the
26. Id.
27. Id. In Baetens v. Commissioner, the taxpayer owned stock in his employer during the
years that the employer contributed funds to the retirement plan. Id.
28. Id. In Baetens, the retirement plan adopted by the employer was a profit-sharing
plan. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. In Baetens, the taxpayer received a distribution from the retirement plan of
$21,077. Id.
31. Id. In Baetens, the taxpayer reinvested the distribution in an individual retirement
account. Id.; see supra note 14 (defining individual retirement account).
32. See Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 184 (1957) (Commis-
sioner has broad discretion to revoke ruling retroactively, and federal courts cannot interfere
with Commissioner's action unless Commissioner abuses discretion); Pulver Roofing Co. v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1001, 1011 (1978) (§ 7805(b) of Code grants Commissioner authority to
revoke retroactively qualified status of retirement plan); I.R.C. § 7805(b) (West 1985) (empow-
ering Commissioner to revoke retroactively prior rulings); see also REv. RurL. 24, 1969-1 C.B.
110, 111 (when employer elects to terminate retirement plan, Commissioner evaluates whether
retirement plan maintained qualified status throughout operation and at time of termination).
See generally Hildebrandt & Goldberg, (ERISA)-Qualified Plans-IRS Determination Letter
Procedures, TAx MOMT. (BNA) 360, A-12 to A-17 (1984) (describing Commissioner's procedure
for determining retirement plan qualification status at time of plan termination). In Baetens,
the taxpayers did not challenge the retirement plan disqualification or the retroactive nature of
the disqualification. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1162.
33. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1161. In Baetens, the Commissioner disqualified the retirement
plan because the retirement plan did not comply with the vesting requirements of § 401(a)(7) of
the Code. Id.; see I.R.C. § 401(a)(7) (West 1985) (prescribing minimum vesting requirements
that retirement plan must include to maintain qualified status). Baetens had no control over the
administration or management of the retirement plan. Appellees' Brief at 18, Baetens v.
Commissioner, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985).
34. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1161.
35. Id.
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Commissioner assessed Baetens with an income tax deficiency for 1977.36
Baetens filed a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the
Commissioner's assessment of deficiency in income tax due. a7
The second case in Baetens involved a group of taxpayers who worked
together as employees for the same employer at the time that they filed their
1978 tax returns.3 8 The employer had maintained a qualified employee
retirement plan and had made contributions to the retirement plan on behalf
of the taxpayers from 1959 through 1977. 39 In 1977 the employer terminated
the retirement plan and distributed the retirement plan assets to the taxpay-
ers. 40 The taxpayers rolled over the entire distributions pursuant to section
402(a)(5) of the Code.41 Subsequently, the Commissioner retroactively dis-
qualified the retirement plan in which the taxpayers participated, because
the employer had discriminated in the operation of the employee retirement
plan. 42 As a result of that discrimination, the Commissioner determined the
retirement plan nonqualified at the time of the distribution.43 Accordingly,
the Commissioner reasoned that the distributions did not qualify for a tax-
free rollover under section 402(a)(5) of the Code. 44 As a result, the Commis-
sioner assessed the taxpayers with an income tax deficiency for 1978. 45 The
taxpayers filed a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the
Commissioner's assessment of deficiency in income tax due."
36. Id. In Baelens, the Commissioner assessed Baetens with an income tax deficiency of
$7,239.16. Id. The taxpayer in Baetens could not have treated the distribution as a capital gain
under § 402(a)(2) because the Commissioner took the position that a retirement plan must
maintain a qualified status in the year of distribution to enable a taxpayer to utilize § 402(a)(2).
See supra note 5 (discussing Commissioner's tax treatment of distributions from disqualified
employee retirement plans).
37. Baetens v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 152, 152 (1984), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir.
1985).
38. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1162.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. In Baetens, the taxpayers in the second case transferred the retirement plan
distribution to an individual retirement account. Id.; see supra note 14 (defining individual
retirement account).
42. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1162; see I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (West 1985) (prohibiting qualification
of retirement plans that discriminate in favor of officers, shareholders, or highly compensated
employees). In Baetens, the taxpayers in the second case had no control over the management
or administration of the retirement plan. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1162; see supra note 33 (employer
in first case in Baetens caused retirement plan disqualification).
43. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1162.
44. Id.
45. Id. In Baetens, the Commissioner assessed the taxpayers in the second case with a
deficiency totaling $11,822.92. Id. The taxpayers in the second case in Baetens could not have
treated the distribution as a capital gain under § 402(a)(2) because the Commissioner took the
position that a retirement plan must maintain a qualified status in the year of distribution to
enable a taxpayer to utilize § 402(a)(2). See supra note 5 (discussing Commissioner's treatment
of distributions from disqualified employee retirement plans).
46. Benbow v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 941, 941 (1984), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir.
1985). In Baetens, the taxpayers in the second case petitioned the Tax Court asserting that the
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In both cases, the Tax Court determined that the tax treatment of a
distribution should depend on the retirement plan and related trust's quali-
fication status at the time of employer contribution rather than at the time
of distribution.47 Under the Tax Court's analysis, a taxpayer could treat the
portion of a distribution attributable to contributions made while a retirement
plan possessed a qualified status as a distribution from a qualified retirement
plan.4 8 Accordingly, in both cases, the Tax Court reduced the deficiency
asserted against the taxpayers, holding that the taxpayers could utilize Code
section 402(a)(5) to rollover distributions attributable to employer contribu-
tions made while the retirement plans maintained a qualified status.49 The
Commissioner appealed the Tax Court decisions to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 0 asserting that the express language of
Code section 402(a)(5) did not support the Tax Court's decision.5 ' The
Commissioner must allow the use of Code § 402(a)(5)'s rollover provision to distributions
attributable to employer contribution made to a qualified employee retirement plan. Id. at 946.
The taxpayers of the second case in Baetens urged the Tax Court to apply the interpretation of
Code § 402(a) which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit formulated in
Greenwald v. Commissioner, and the interpretation which the Tax Court formerly adopted in
Woodson v. Commissioner. Id. at 947; see Greenwald v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 538, 541 (2d
Cir. 1966) (allowing taxpayer to utilize capital gain rates in determining tax liability on
distribution from disqualified retirement plan); Woodson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 779, 786
(1980) (requiring employee retirement plan to maintain qualification status only in year of
employer contribution to enable taxpayer to utilize capital gain rate in determining tax liability
on subsequent distribution), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1981); infra notes 63-74 and
accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's analysis in Greenwald v. Commissioner); infra
note 68 (discussing Tax Court's analysis in Woodson v. Commissioner).
47. See Benbow v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 941, 947 (1984) (interpreting language contained
in Code § 402(a)(5)), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985); Baetens v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.
152, 163 (1984) (interpreting language contained in Code § 402(a)(5)), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th
Cir. 1985). The Tax Court, in both Benbow v. Commissioner and Baetens v. Commissioner,
interpreted the language contained in Code § 402(a) by following the analysis formerly adopted
by the Tax Court in Woodson v. Commissioner. Benbow, 82 T.C. at 947; Baelens, 82 T.C. at
160-63; see Woodson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 779, 785-86 (1980) (analyzing language contained
in Code § 402(a)), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1981); infra note 68 (discussing Tax Court's
analysis of Code § 402(a) in Woodson v. Commissioner).
48. Benbow v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 941, 948 (1984), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir.
1985); Baetens v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 152, 170 (1984), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985).
49. See Benbow v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 941, 947 (1984) (allowing taxpayers to rollover
portion of distributions from disqualified retirement plan that formerly maintained qualified
status), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985); Baetens v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 152, 170 (1984)
(allowing taxpayer to rollover distribution from disqualified plan that formerly maintained
qualified status), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985).
50. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1160. Section 7482(a) of the Code allows a taxpayer or the
Commissioner to appeal a Tax Court decision to the proper United States Court of Appeals.
I.R.C. § 7482(a) (West 1985). In Baetens, proper venue for the Commissioner's appeal rested
in the Sixth Circuit because the taxpayers resided in Michigan and Ohio. See Benbow v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 941, 943 (1984) (taxpayers resided in Ohio), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th
Cir. 1985); Baetens v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 152, 152 (1984) (taxpayer resided in Michigan),
rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985); see also I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(A) (West 1985) (circuit in
which taxpayer resides is proper venue for redetermination of tax liability).
51. Appellant's Brief at 15, Baetens v. Commissioner, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985); see
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Commissioner also argued that a relevant Treasury Department regulation
requires that a retirement plan must meet the qualification requirements in
the year of a distribution for section 402(a) of the Code to apply to the
distribution.5 2 The Sixth Circuit adopted the Commissioner's arguments and
reversed the Tax Court's decisions.
53
In Baetens, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the express language, legislative
history, and applicable Treasury regulations of Code section 402(a)(5).5 4
Based on that review, the Sixth Circuit rejected the Tax Court's interpretation
of Code section 402(a)(5).1 The Sixth Circuit, in construing the language of
Code section 402(a)(5), determined that the phrase "which is exempt from
tax" clearly required a retirement plan and related trust to meet the quali-
fication requirements at the time of distribution to entitle a taxpayer to
utilize the tax-free rollover provision.16 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that, to
adopt the Tax Court's interpretation, section 402(a)(5) of the Code must
read "which is or has been exempt from tax. '" 57 The Sixth Circuit criticized
the Tax Court's expansive interpretation as an accommodation to meet the
equities of the particular case." The Baetens court noted that the inequitable
result of penalizing innocent employees through plan disqualification should
not influence the objective interpretation of a statute. 59 The Sixth Circuit
stated that Congress, in drafting any legislation, had the responsibility to
consider the equitable ramifications.6 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit deter-
mined that Congress had considered the punitive effects of retirement plan
disqualification, yet had retained retirement plan disqualification as a penalty
for violation of the qualification requirements. 6' Accordingly, the Baetens
court determined that the Tax Court's expansive interpretation of Code
section 402(a)(5), permitting a partial rollover, contravened Congress' legis-
lative purpose.
62
In criticizing the Tax Court's expansive interpretation of Code section
402(a)(5), the Baetens court also criticized the United States Court of Appeals
infra notes 86-115 and accompanying text (analyzing Baetens court's interpretation of language
contained in § 402(a)(5)).
52. Appellant's Brief at 21, Baetens v. Commissioner, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985); see
infra notes 122-39 and accompanying text (analyzing Baetens court's application of Treasury
regulation § 1.402(a)-1(a)(1)(ii)).
53. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1167.
54. Id. at 1163-67.
55. Id. at 1167.
56. Id.; see infra notes 86-115 and accompanying text (analyzing Baetens court's interpre-
tation of language contained in § 402(a)(5)).
57. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1163.
58. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1164.
59. Id. at 1167.
60. Id. at 1164.
61. Id.; see S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 94-95 (when Commissioner disqualifies
retirement plan because of employer's act, innocent employees lose tax benefits and must pay
tax out of funds otherwise available for retirement), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.
NEws 4890, 4978.
62. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1164.
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for the Second Circuit's liberal interpretation of section 402(a)(2) in Green-
wald v. Commissioner.63 In Greenwald, a taxpayer had received a distribution
from an employee retirement plan."4 The employee retirement plan had
maintained a qualified status during a portion of the time that the employer
had made contributions to the retirement plan. 6 The Commissioner, how-
ever, disqualified the retirement plan prior to the time of the distribution.66
The Greenwald court held that the language "which is exempt from tax"
did not require a complete denial of the capital gain treatment. 67 The Second
Circuit reasoned that a comprehensive denial would favor inequitably tax-
payers who withdrew from a retirement plan prior to disqualification.68
63. Id. at 1163-64; see Greenwald v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1966) (Code §
402(a) does not require harsh treatment of denying capital gain rates to distributions attributable
to employer contributions made to qualified retirement plan that Commissioner subsequently
disqualifies).
64. Greenwald, 366 F.2d at 540. In Greenwald v. Commissioner, the taxpayer received a
distribution totaling $168,923. Id.
65. Id. at 541.
66. Id. at 540.
67. Id. at 541.
68. Id. In Woodson v. Commissioner, the Tax Court followed Greenwald's equitable
interpretation of Code § 402(a)(2) in allowing a taxpayer to treat a distribution from a
disqualified retirement plan as a capital gain. See Woodson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 779, 786
(1980) (interpreting language contained in § 402(a)(2)), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1981).
The Woodson Tax Court reasoned that, because Congress had not mandated expressly a
comprehensive disqualification under Code § 402(a)(2), no reason existed to adopt a rule of law
that could cause inequities. Id. at 784. The Woodson Tax Court, in supporting their interpre-
tation of § 402(a)(2) compared the application of other sections of the Code with § 402(a)(2).
Id. at 785. The Tax Court in Woodson first analyzed the statutory symmetry of sections 402(a)
and 402(b). Id.; see I.R.C. § 402(b) (West 1985) (prescribing tax treatment of employer
contributions to nonqualified employee retirement plan). The Woodson Tax Court noted that
Code § 402(b) requires the Commissioner to tax employer contributions to employee retirement
plans based on the retirement plan's qualification status in the year of contribution. Woodson,
73 T.C. at 785. The Tax Court in Woodson noted that, when a nonqualified retirement plan
becomes qualified in a later year and then makes a distribution, the Commissioner does not tax
the distribution as solely from a qualified retirement plan. Id. Rather, the Commissioner would
tax any contribution made to a retirement plan after achieving qualified status under § 402(a).
Id. Accordingly, the Woodson Tax Court rationalized that, in order to achieve statutory
symmetry between Code sections 402(a) and 402(b), the Commissioner must not tax distributions
from a retirement plan that once maintained a qualified status yet later became disqualified as
a distribution solely from a nonqualified retirement plan. Id. Consequently, the Tax Court in
Woodson concluded that the Commissioner should treat an amount contributed to a qualified
retirement plan as a distribution from a qualified retirement plan. Id.
In addition to analyzing the symmetry of sections 402(a) and 402(b), the Woodson Tax
Court also looked to § 404(a)(3)(A) to support the court's conclusion that, when an employer
makes a contribution to a qualified retirement plan, the amount contributed should retain the
characteristics of qualification regardless of subsequent disqualification. Id.; see I.R.C. §
404(a)(3)(A) (allowing carry forward of deduction for employer contribution to qualified
employee retirement plan). Under § 404(a)(3)(A), when an employer makes a contribution in
excess of the maximum amount allowable, the employer can deduct the excess contribution in
the following year regardless of whether the retirement plan remains qualified. I.R.C. §
404(a)(3)(A); see Royer's, Inc. v. United States, 265 F.2d 615, 618 (3d Cir. 1959) (allowing
employer to carry forward excess retirement plan contribution deduction to year in which
retirement plan did not meet qualification requirements).
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Accordingly, the Greenwald court allowed capital gains treatment under
Code section 402(a)(2) for the portion of the distribution attributable to
employer contributions made to the retirement plan while the retirement plan
met the qualification requirements. 69 The Sixth Circuit criticized the Green-
wald court's analysis because the Greenwald court relied on equitable prin-
ciples rather than statutory support in determining the outcome of the case. 0
Additionally, the Baetens court criticized the Second Circuit's complete
failure to acknowledge a Treasury regulation that required both the employee
retirement plan and related trust to meet the qualification requirements in
the year of distribution for Code section 402(a) to apply.
7'
The Sixth Circuit, however, in reaching its decision in Baetens to disallow
the rollover, analyzed the relevant Treasury regulation in interpreting section
402(a)(5) of the Code.72 The Baetens court found that section 1.402(a)-
l(a)(1)(ii)73 of the Treasury regulations supported the holding that an em-
ployee retirement plan and related trust must meet the qualification require-
ments in the year of distribution for such distribution to be eligible for the
favorable tax treatment provided by Code section 402(a).7 4 Section 1.402(a)-
l(a)(1)(ii) of the Treasury regulations states that the provisions of Code
section 402(a) relate only to a distribution by a retirement plan that meets
the qualification requirements in the tax year in which the employer makes
the distribution. 75 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit noted that the Tax Court,
in Baetens, had confused the Treasury regulations applicable to Code section
402(a) because of cross referencing errors that resulted when the Commis-
sioner renumbered the applicable Treasury regulations.
76
In addition to evaluating the specific language of Code section 402(a)(5)
and the applicable Treasury regulation, the Baetens court also reviewed the
69. Greenwald, 366 F.2d at 541.
70. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1163. In Greenwald, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reasoned that denial of the long term capital gain treatment to the taxpayer
would favor inequitably other employees of the same employer who had terminated employment
and had received a distribution prior to the disqualification of the retirement plan. Greenwald,
366 F.2d at 541. The Second Circuit noted that employees terminating before plan disqualifi-
cation could apply capital gain treatment to a distribution attributable to funds contributed to
the retirement plan during the same period in which the employer contributed funds on the
Greenwald taxpayer's behalf. Id.
71. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1164; see infra notes 122-39 and accompanying text (analyzing
applicability of Treasury regulation to Baetens decision).
72. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1164.
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 219, 234.
74. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1164.
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(a)(l)(ii), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 219, 234.
76. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1166. The Tax Court in Baetens stated that the Treasury
regulations underlying § 402(a) did not address the circumstances of the case. Baetens v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 152, 163-64 (1984), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985). The Sixth
Circuit, however, determined that an error by the Commissioner in renumbering the Treasury
regulations confused the Baetens Tax Court. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1166; see Baetens v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 152, 163-64 (1984) (discussing relevancy of Treasury regulations to
interpretation of Code section 402(a)), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985).
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legislative history of Code section 402(a)(5). 7 7 The Sixth Circuit noted that
Congress enacted Code section 402(a)(5) to enhance the mobility of accu-
mulated retirement benefits. 7 The Baetens court also noted that Congress
previously had considered establishing a central portability fund in lieu of
Code section 402(a)(5) to enhance the portability of accumulated retirement
benefits. 79 Under the central portability fund concept, an employee upon
leaving a job could direct his employer to pay the value of the employee's
accumulated retirement funds to a central fund.80 Under the proposed central
fund concept, however, only transfers from qualified retirement plans were
eligible for deposit into the central fund.8 ' In discussing the central fund
concept, Congress noted that not allowing participants of nonqualified
employee retirement plans to participate in the central portability fund was
consistent with the present law of taxing distributions from nonqualified
retirement plans as ordinary income. 2 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that, at the time of enacting Code section 402(a)(5), Congress under-
stood the tax law as requiring that a retirement plan must meet the qualification
requirements at the time of a distribution before enabling a taxpayer to
utilize the favorable provisions of Code section 402(a).83
The Sixth Circuit in Baetens, correctly determined that an employee
retirement plan must maintain a qualified status, in the year of distribution,
for a participant to utilize the favorable tax treatment of Code section
402(a)(5).8 The language of Code section 402(a)(5), the applicable Treasury
regulation, and the legislative history clearly support the Sixth Circuit's
interpretation and application of Code section 402(a)(5).85 In interpreting a
statute, courts generally begin by analyzing the specific language at issue.
86
Courts analyze the specific language by applying ordinary meanings to the
77. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1164-65.
78. Id. at 1165; see H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 341 (discussing need to
provide mechanism to facilitate transfer of employee's retirement plan funds when employee
changes jobs), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 415, 502.
79. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1165.
80. H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 341, reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 415, 502.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1165; see infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text (discussing
Baetens court's analysis of legislative history).
84. See Baeens, 777 F.2d at 1167 (Baetens court interpreted language in § 402(a)(5) to
require retirement plan to meet qualifications requirements at time of distribution); supra notes
11-12 (explaining requirements that taxpayers must satisfy to utilize § 402(a)(5) rollover
provision).
85. See infra notes 86-146 and accompanying text (analyzing language of § 402(a)(5),
applicable Treasury regulation, and legislative history).
86. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) (analysis of any case
involving interpretation of statute must begin with language of statute itself); Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979) (starting point in every case concerning construction of statute
is language of statute); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (starting point
in cases dealing with statutory interpretation is analysis of statutory language).
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words contained in the statute.87 The Tax Court in Baetens had suggested
that the language "which is exempt from tax" was ambiguous.18 The Tax
Court had complained that the language indicated that the qualified status
must exist but that the language failed to specify when the qualified status
must exist.89 Ultimately, however, the Baetens Tax Court determined that
the qualified status need exist only at the time of employer contribution to
entitle a retirement plan participant to utilize the favorable treatment of
Code section 402(a)(5)2 Such a determination requires an expansive rather
than ordinary interpretation of the language, "which is." 9' In Cass v.
Commissioner,92 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
previously had rejected a Tax Court decision that had espoused a liberal
interpretation of the language contained in Code section 402(a)(5). 93 Cass v.
Commissioner arose from the identical retirement plan distribution that the
Sixth Circuit had considered in the second case in Baetens9 4 In Cass, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the language "which is exempt from tax"
clearly meant exempt from tax at the time the employer made the distribu-
tion. 9 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the Tax Court's expansive inter-
pretation, permitting a partial rollover, would require the Commissioner to
tax retirement plan distributions in two components." One component would
represent contributions made while the retirement plan maintained a qualified
status. 97 The other component would represent contributions made while the
retirement plan maintained a nonqualified status.98 The Seventh Circuit
concluded that an interpretation requiring the separate treatment of a distri-
bution's components clearly exceeded the ordinary meaning of the language
"which is exempt from tax." 99
Similarly, in Woodson v. Commissioner, '0 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had determined that the Tax Court's liberal
interpretation of the language in Code section 402(a)(2) exceeded the ordinary
87. See David Bros., Inc. v. Donovan, 700 F.2d 1368, 1370 (11th Cir. 1983) (courts
presume that, in drafting statutes, Congress uses words in their ordinary sense, unless Congress
expressly indicated contrary).
88. Baetens v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 152, 163 (1984), rey'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir.
1985).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 167.
9L Woodson v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1094, 1095 (5th Cir. 1981).
92. 774 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1985), rev'g 82 T.C. 941 (1984).
93. Id. at 745; see infra note 99 and accompanying text (Seventh Circuit found expansive
interpretation of § 402(a)(5) unreasonable).
94. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1164; see supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text (discussing
facts from which second case in Baetens arose).
95. Cass, 774 F.2d at 742.
96. Id. at 744.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 744 (Seventh Circuit found expansive interpretation of language contained
in Code section 402(a)(5) unreasonable).
100. 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'g 73 T.C. 779 (1980).
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meaning of the language in issue.101 In Woodson, the taxpayer had partici-
pated in an employee retirement plan from 1966 through 1974.102 In 1974
the taxpayer received a distribution from the retirement plan."3 The taxpayer
treated the distribution as a capital gain, pursuant to Code section 402(a)(2).'10
In 1975 the Commissioner retroactively revoked the retirement plan's quali-
fied status because the Woodson employer diverted plan funds for purposes
other than payment of retirement benefits. 05 As a result of the employer's
diversion of retirement funds, the Commissioner claimed that the distribution
did not qualify for capital gain treatment because the retirement plan did
not have a qualified status at the time of distribution.1 06 Accordingly, the
Commissioner assessed the taxpayer with a deficiency for income tax due. 07
In determining that the distribution did not qualify for capital gain treatment,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Tax Court's expansive interpretation of
Code section 402(a)(2) would force a modification of the absolute word "is"
to include "is or has been."'' Additionally, in interpreting the language
contained in section 402(a)(2), the Fifth Circuit criticized the Tax Court's
consideration of the fact that the employer, and not the employees, had
caused the plan disqualification. 109 Thus, the Fifth Circuit in Woodson
rejected the Tax Court's expansive interpretation of Code section 402(a)(2). "°
Despite the Fifth Circuit's reversal of the Tax Court's decision in
Woodson v. Commissioner, the Tax Court adheres to its earlier interpretation
of Code section 402(a)."' Because of the rule established in Golsen v.
101. Id. at 1095. In Woodson, the retirement plan adopted by the employer was a profit
sharing plan. Id. at 1094.
102. Id.
103. Id. In Woodson, the taxpayer received a distribution totaling $30,052.81. Woodson
v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 779, 780 (1980), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1094 (1981).
104. Woodson, 651 F.2d at 1094.
105. Woodson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 779, 781 (1980), rev'd, 541 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir.
1981). In Woodson, the taxpayer had no control over the management or administration of the
employee retirement plan. Id. at 784; see supra notes 33, 42 (in Baetens, employers' actions
caused Commissioner to disqualify retirement plans); see also I.R.C. § 401(a)(2) (West 1985)
(proscribing employer diversion of retirement plan funds for purposes other than exclusive
benefit of retirement plan participants).
106. Woodson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 779, 780 (1980), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir.
1981).
107. Id.
108. Woodson, 651 F.2d at 1095.
109. Id. In Woodson, the Fifth Circuit rejected the Tax Court's reliance on equitable
policy considerations to allow the capital gain treatment because the Fifth Circuit recognized
countervailing policy considerations for denying the capital gain treatment. Id. n.4. The Fifth
Circuit reasoned that plan disqualification serves as a valuable deterrent that inhibits employers
from violating pension tax laws. Id.
I10. Id. at 1096.
111. See, e.g., Boggs v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 132, 152 (1984) (allowing taxpayer to
utilize rollover treatment of distribution from disqualified retirement plan); Benbow v. Com-
missioner, 82 T.C. 941, 948 (1984) (allowing taxpayer to utilize rollover treatment of distribution
from disqualified retirement plan), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985); Baetens v. Commis-
sioner, 82 T.C. 152, 170 (1984) (allowing taxpayer to utilize rollover treatment of distribution
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Commissioner, z12 the Tax Court can continue to allow taxpayers to partially
utilize the benefits of Code sections 402(a)(2) and 402(a)(5), in cases involving
taxpayers who reside in circuits that have not rejected the Tax Court's
expansive interpretation of Code sections 402(a)(2) and 402(a)(5).11 Addi-
tionally, several federal district courts have adopted the Tax Court's partial
application of Code sections 402(a)(2) and 402(a)(5). 1 4 Nevertheless, the
Seventh Circuit's analysis in Cass and the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Woodson
show clearly that an expansive interpretation of Code sections 402(a)(2) and
402(a)(5) is unreasonable, and support the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of
section 402(a)(5) in Baetens.'11
In interpreting the language of Code section 402(a)(5), the Sixth Circuit
correctly criticized the Greenwald court's sole reliance on equitable consid-
erations in adopting a partial application of Code section 402(a)(2).116 The
United States Supreme Court has declared that federal courts do not have
the power to expand the language of a statute to mitigate or improve the
statute's effects." 7 Expansion of a statute is a legislative power reserved for
Congress, not for courts."18 In drafting legislation relating to the disqualifi-
from disqualified retirement plan), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985); Sturdivant v. Com-
missioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1022, 1025 (1980) (allowing taxpayer to utilize capital gain
treatment of distribution from disqualified retirement plan). But see Woodson v. Commissioner,
651 F.2d 1094, 1096 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'g 73 T.C. 779 (1980) (rejecting Woodson Tax Court's
liberal interpretation of language contained in § 402(a)).
112. 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940
(1971).
113. Id. at 756-58. In Golsen v. Commissioner, the Tax Court announced that the Tax
Court will follow circuit court decisions from a circuit to which a particular taxpayer could
appeal. Id. at 757. In Golsen, the taxpayer presented a Fifth Circuit decision, directly on point,
that supported the deduction of the item in question. Id. at 756. The Commissioner, however,
offered authority directly on point from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit that supported the denial of a deduction for the item in question. Id. The Golsen court
concluded that, because an appeal by the taxpayer would lie in the Tenth Circuit, the Tax Court
would follow the Tenth Circuit precedent and deny the deduction in issue. Id. at 757.
114. See, e.g., Hesse v. Commissioner, 47 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 81-1024, at 1025 (E.D. Mo.
1980) (allowing taxpayer to utilize rollover treatment of distribution from disqualified retirement
plan); Dudinsky v. United States, 46 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 80-5111, at 5113 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (allow-
ing taxpayer to utilize capital gain treatment of distribution from disqualified retirement plan);
Pitt v. United States, 75 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 75-1492, at 1493 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (allowing taxpayer
to utilize capital gain treatment of distribution from disqualified retirement plan).
115. See supra notes 97-110 and accompanying text (discussing Cass and Woodson courts'
interpretation of language contained in § 402(a)).
116. See Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1163 (Baetens court criticized Greenwald court's policy
oriented interpretation of language in § 402(a)).
117. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979) (under constitutional
framework federal courts do not have power to sit as councils to revise legislation to comply
with federal courts' own conceptions of public policy); Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27
(1933) (in interpreting statutes, federal courts should not consider whether reconstructing statute
would allow fairer results).
118. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (Congress has exclusive




cation of employee retirement plans, Congress expressly recognized the
possibility that the use of disqualification as a punishment might cause
innocent employees to lose tax benefits." 9 Congress, nevertheless, retained
disqualification as a penalty to deter employer abuses of employee retirement
plans. 20 Accordingly, the Baetens court acted properly by not adopting an
expansive interpretation of Code section 402(a)(5) in light of Congress'
awareness of the potential inequitable results of retirement plan disqualifi-
cation and informed retention of plan disqualification as a method of
regulating employee retirement plans.' 2'
In determining the proper tax treatment of a distribution from a dis-
qualified employee retirement plan, the Sixth Circuit correctly upheld the
validity of Treasury regulation section 1.402(a)-1(a)(1)(ii).122 The Baetens Tax
Court had invalidated Treasury regulation section 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii), assert-
ing that the Treasury regulation was an unreasonable interpretation of Code
section 402(a). 23 Generally, federal courts give substantial deference to
Treasury regulations. 24 Federal courts, however, can invalidate Treasury
119. See S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 94-95 (1973) (consequences of employers'
violations of tax laws regulating employee retirement plans tend to fall upon innocent employ-
ees), reprinted in 1974-4 C.B. Supp. 80, 173-74.
120. See I.R.C. § 401 (West 1985) (proscribing employer abuses of employee retirement
plans).
121. See supra notes 86-120 and accompanying text (analyzing Sixth Circuit's interpretation
of language contained in § 402(a)(5)).
122. See Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1166 (Baetens court upheld validity of Treasury regulation
§ 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii)); infra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of Treasury
regulation § 1.402(a)-1(a)(1)(ii)).
123. Bactens v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 152, 165 (1984), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir.
1985).
124. See Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446-47 (1936) (federal courts must give
great weight to Treasury regulations developed by Commissioner); Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S.
327, 336 (1930) (federal courts must not invalidate Treasury regulations adopted by Commis-
sioner except for weighty reasons); Commissioner v. Pepsi-Cola Niagara Bottling Corp., 399
F.2d 390, 393 (2d Cir. 1968) (when Congress grants administrator power to promulgate
regulations, federal courts must respect regulations within reason). The Commissioner has the
authority to promulgate two types of Treasury regulations. See Westin, Dubious Interpretative
Rules for Constructing Federal Taxing Statutes, 17 WAKE FORE T L. REV. 1, 16 (1981) (discussing
authoritative value of Treasury regulations). Federal courts refer to one type of Treasury
regulations as interpretative regulations. Id. at 17. Section 7805(a) of the Code grants the
Commissioner the authority to promulgate interpretative Treasury regulations. I.R.C. § 7805(a)
(West 1985). Treasury regulation § 1.402(a)-1(a)(1)(ii) is an interpretative regulation. See I.R.C.
§ 402(a) (§ 402(a) does not grant Commissioner specific authority to promulgate Treasury
regulations concerning taxation of retirement plan distributions). Federal courts classify the
second category of Treasury regulations as legislative regulations. Westin, supra, at 17. The
Commissioner promulgates legislative regulations that address Congress' specific concerns with
the application of the Code, pursuant to authority granted by a particular Code section. Id.;
see, e.g., I.R.C. § 1442(b) (granting Commissioner authority to issue Treasury regulations
allowing exemptions to foreign corporations for withholding of income tax); id. § 1494 (granting
Commissioner authority to issue Treasury regulations to regulate payment and collection of
income tax); id. § 1502 (granting Commissioner authority to issue Treasury regulations necessary
to determine tax liability of corporations filing consolidated returns). See generally J. CHOMMIE,
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regulations that contradict the congressional intent of the applicable statute,
contradict the express terms of the statute, or are unreasonable. 2- In deter-
mining whether a Treasury regulation is reasonable, courts evaluate the
Treasury regulation's requirements in light of the language of the applicable
statute.2 26 Treasury regulation section 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii) mandates that the
provisions of Code section 402(a) apply only to distributions by a retirement
plan that the Commissioner considers qualified in the year in which the
employer makes the distribution. 27 Both the Seventh Circuit in Cass v.
Commissioner and the Fifth Circuit in Woodson v. Commissioner determined
that the language of Treasury regulation section 1.402(a)-1(a)(1)(ii) reasona-
bly interpreted the language of Code section 402(a). 21 Accordingly, the Sixth
Circuit in Baetens had sufficient precedent to find Treasury regulation section
1.402(a)-i(a)(1)(ii) reasonable.229
In evaluating the legal force of Treasury regulations, federal courts
consider several elements.110 One element that federal courts take into account
is the length of time that the Treasury regulation has existed. 3' Treasury
FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION 13 (2d ed. 1973) (describing types of Treasury regulations which
Commissioner issues); Rogorin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactiv-
ity-A View From Within, 43 TAxEs 756, 758 (1965) (discussing role of Treasury regulations in
federal income taxation).
125. See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299. 307 (1967) (in evaluating Treasury
regulations federal courts must evaluate whether Commissioner's Treasury regulations implement
Congress' mandate in reasonable manner); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. United States, 589 F.2d
1040, 1045 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1978) (federal courts consider Treasury regulations that are unreasonable
and contradict terms of applicable statute invalid).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Vogal Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 25 (1982) (in determining
whether Treasury regulation is valid, federal courts should consider whether Treasury regulation
harmonizes with statutory language); National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S.
472, 477 (1979) (federal courts should analyze validity of Treasury regulation by comparing
related statutes plain language); Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501
(1948) (in determining whether Treasury regulation is valid, federal courts should determine
whether Treasury regulation is consistent with language of related statute).
127. Treas. Reg. § 1,402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 CB. 219, 234.
128. See Cass, 774 F.2d at 743 (Cass court determined that Treasury regulation § 1.402(a)-
l(a)(l)(ii) interprets Code section 402(a) in reasonable manner); Woodson, 651 F.2d at 1096
(Woodson court concluded that Treasury regulation § 1.402(a)-l(a)(l)(ii) interprets Code §
402(a) in reasonable manner), But see Brillembourg, supra note 1, at 1202-05 (evaluating
Treasury regulations interpreting code § 402(a)).
129. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing cases which have held Treasury
regulation § !,402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii) reasonable and valid).
130. See infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text (discussing elements that federal courts
consider in evaluating validity of Treasury regulations).
131, See, e.g., National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)
(in evaluating validity of Treasury regulations, federal courts should consider length of time
regulation has been in effect); Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 682 (1965)
(Supreme Court has held in many cases that longstanding interpretative Treasury regulation,
applying to substantially reenacted statute, has received congressional approval and effect of
law); Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938) (Supreme Court deems Treasury regulations
long continued without substantial change to have force of law); see also Westin, supra note
124, at 19 (with passage of time, federal courts assume that taxpayers have relied on Treasury
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regulation section 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii) restates Treasury regulation section
29.165-6,112 which the Commissioner promulgated in 1943. Accordingly,
federal courts should grant Treasury regulation section 1.402(a)-i(a)(1)(ii)
substantial deference based on its longstanding presence.' Another element
that federal courts consider in appraising the legitimacy of a Treasury
regulation is whether other federal courts have relied on the Treasury
regulation in deciding tax cases. 3 4 Both the Fifth Circuit in Woodson and
the Seventh Circuit in Cass relied on Treasury regulation section 1.402(a)-
l(a)(1)(ii) in disallowing the partial application of Code section 402(a).' s In
evaluating the validity of Treasury regulations, federal courts also consider
the degree of scrutiny that Congress gives a Treasury regulation during
subsequent reenactments of the related Code section. 3 6 During the reenact-
ment of Code section 402(a), Congress did not mention specifically Treasury
regulation section 1.402(a)-1(a)(1)(ii). Congress, however, did state that,
under the present tax laws, the Commissioner taxes distributions from a
retirement plan as ordinary income unless the retirement plan has a qualified
status in the year the employer makes the distribution.3 7 Congress' statement
regulation and that reversal of longstanding Treasury regulation would cause more inconvenience
and confusion than benefit).
132. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-6, T.D. 5278, 1943 C.B. 478, 486; see Baetens v. Commis-
sioner, 82 T.C. 152, 164 n.13 (1984) (Baetens Tax Court acknowledged that Treasury regulation
§ 1.402(a)-l(a)(l)(ii) was longstanding Treasury regulation), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir.
1985).
133. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (federal courts generally do not invalidate
longstanding Treasury regulations).
134. See National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) (in
evaluating validity of Treasury regulations federal courts should consider reliance that other
federal courts have placed on particular Treasury regulation in deciding cases); Cammarano v.
United States, 358 U.S. 498, 510 (1959) (federal courts should consider consistent application
of Treasury regulation by other federal courts, in determining Treasury regulation's validity).
135. See Cass, 774 F.2d at 743 (Cass court relied on Treasury regulation § 1.402(a)-
l(a)(l)(ii) in determining taxability of distribution from disqualified retirement plan); Woodson,
651 F.2d at 1096 (Woodson court cited Treasury regulation § 1.402(a)-1(a)(1)(ii) to support
denial of capital gain treatment to distribution from disqualified retirement plan); see also
Oliphant v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 744, 748-49 (1955) (relying on § 29.165-6 of Regulation 111
of Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to deny favorable treatment to distribution from disqualified
retirement plan), aff'd, 234 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1956); Lyon v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 187, 188
(1954) (relying on § 29.165-6 of Regulation 111 of Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to deny
favorable treatment to distribution from disqualified retirement plan); supra note 132 and
accompanying text (Treasury regulation § 1.402(a)-l(a)(IXii) essentially restatement of § 29.165-
6 of Regulation Ill of Internal Revenue Code of 1939).
136. See National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) (to
evaluate validity of Treasury regulation federal courts should consider Congress' consideration
of particular Treasury regulation in Congress' reenacting related statute); Helvering v. Winmill,
305 U.S. 79, 82 (1938) (federal courts should consider longstanding Treasury regulations that
apply to unamended or substantially reenacted statute to have received congressional approval
and to have effect of law); see also J. CHomeum, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION 13 (2d ed, 1973)
(when Congress reenacts statute, federal courts deem Congress to have approved consistent and
longstanding Treasury regulations that interpret statute).
137. See S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1973) (under current tax law,
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basically restates the requirement of Treasury regulation section 1.402(a)-
1(a)(1)(ii).'38 Accordingly, because of Treasury regulation section 1.402(a)-
l(a)(1)(ii)'s reasonable comparison with Code section 402(a), because of
Treasury regulation section 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii)'s longstanding presence and
because of other federal courts' reliance thereon, the Baetens court properly
upheld and followed Treasury regulation section 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii). 3 9
In evaluating the legislative history of Code section 402(a)(5), the Baetens
court correctly concluded that, at the time of enacting section 402(a)(5),
Congress understood the tax laws to require a retirement plan to have a
qualified status in the year of distribution to allow participants to utilize the
favorable provisions of Code section 402(a).140 Congress' assessment dispells
a great deal of uncertainty in the interpretation of Code section 402(a).141 In
1966 the Second Circuit in Greenwald v. Commissioner had interpreted the
language "which is exempt from tax" to require that a plan must maintain
a qualified status only at the time of employer contribution, for a participant
to utilize the favorable treatment of Code section 402(a). 42 In 1969 Congress
reenacted Code section 402(a) retaining the language "which is exempt from
tax.' ' 43 In 1974, Congress again reenacted Code section 402(a), leaving the
language "which is exempt from tax" unchanged. 44 Additionally, in 1974,
Congress enacted Code section 402(a)(5), employing the identical phrase
"which is exempt from tax."'' 4 One commentator has proposed that, because
Congress reenacted Code section 402(a) without modifying the language
"which is exempt from tax," Congress may have approved the Greenwald
interpretation of Code section 402(a), requiring a qualified status only at the
time of contribution.'4 Congress, however, in drafting Code section 402(a)(5),
Commissioner taxes retirement plan participants as receiving ordinary income when participants
receive distributions from retirement plans that do not possess qualified status in year of
distribution), reprinted in 1974-4 C.B. Supt. 80, 154.
138. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of Treasury
regulation § 1.402(a)-1(a)(l)(ii)).
139. See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text (discussing elements that federal courts
should consider in evaluating validity of Treasury regulations).
140. See Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1165 (Baetens court reviewed legislative history of Code §
402(a)(5)); infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text (discussing Sixth Circuit's review in Baetens
of § 402(a)(5)'s legislative history).
141. See infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text (analyzing Congress' understanding of
tax laws governing taxation of distributions from disqualified retirement plans).
142. Greenwald, 366 F.2d at 541; see supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text (discussing
Sixth Circuit's criticism of Second Circuit's analysis in Greenwald v. Commissioner).
143. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 515, 83 Stat. 487, 643 (reenacting
Code § 402(a)(2) providing capital gain treatment to retirement plan distributions).
144. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2005(b),
88 Stat. 829, 990 (reenacting Code § 402(a)(2) providing capital gain treatment to retirement
plan distributions).
145. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, §
6693(g)(5), 88 Stat. 829, 968-69 (enacting Code § 402(a)(5) to allow rollover of retirement plan
distributions).
146. See Brillembourg, supra note 1, at 1210 (fact that language of § 402(a)(2) was not




expressly stated that the current tax laws require a retirement plan to maintain
a qualified status in the year of distribution to allow participants to utilize
the provisions of Code section 402(a). 47 Accordingly, Congress recognized
the principle stated by Treasury regulation section 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii) as an
accurate interpretation of Code section 402(a), rather than the Greenwald
court's interpretation.'
48
The legislative history of Code section 408(d)(3)149 also supports the
principle that a retirement plan must maintain a qualified status in the year
of distribution for participants to utilize a favorable tax provision.5 0 Code
section 408(d)(3) allows taxpayers to rollover funds tax-free from an individ-
ual retirement account' 51 to another individual retirement account, retirement
annuity,'52 or qualified employee retirement plan. 153 Congress enacted Code
section 408(d)(3) at the same time that Congress enacted Code section
402(a)(5). 54 Additionally, Congress enacted Code section 408(d)(3) for the
same purpose that Congress enacted Code section 402(a)(5). 155 Congress
enacted Code section 408(d)(3) to allow working individuals to transfer funds
from one retirement savings device to another, without incurring tax liability
at the time of the transfer. 15 6 Congress saw the need for the flexible transfers
of funds because of the highly mobile American workforce. 17 Congress,
147. See S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1973) (under current tax laws,
Commissioner taxes retirement plan participants as receiving ordinary income when participants
receive distributions from retirement plans that do not meet qualification requirements in year
of distribution), reprinted in 1974-4 C.B. Supp. 80, 154.
148. See supra notes 122-39 and accompanying text (discussing Treasury regulation §
1.402(a)-1(a)(1)(ii)).
149. I.R.C. § 408(d)(3) (West 1985).
150. See H.R. REp. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 139 n.17 (taxpayers cannot rollover
funds from individual retirement account that Commissioner has disqualified), reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4670, 4804; infra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing
similarities between Code § 408(d)(3) and § 402(a)(5)).
151. See I.R.C. § 408(a) (West 1985) (defining individual retirement account as domestic
trust created by taxpayer for exclusive benefit of taxpayer and beneficiaries).
152. See id. § 408(b) (defining retirement annuity as endowment contract issued by insurance
company).
153. Id. § 408(d)(3). Section 408(d)(3) of the Code allows a taxpayer to withdraw the entire
balance of funds from an individual retirement account and to reinvest the funds in another
eligible retirement account. Id. The taxpayer, however, must reinvest the withdrawn funds
within 60 days of receipt. Id. § 408(d)(3)(A)(i); see supra note 3 (defining qualified employee
retirement plan and qualification requirements).
154. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, §§
408(d)(3), 2002(g)(5), 88 Stat. 829, 961, 968-69 (enacting Code sections 408(dX3) and 402(a)(5) to
allow rollovers of accumulated retirement funds).
155. See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' purpose for
enacting Code § 408(d)(3)); supra note 11 (Congress enacted code § 402(a)(5) to provide
flexibility with respect to retirement savings and related investments).
156. See H.R. REp. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30 (because America has highly
mobile economy with high employee turnover, need exists to establish system for transfer of
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however, in enacting Code section 408(d)(3), expressly stated that a taxpayer
could not rollover funds from an individual retirement account that the
Commissioner had disqualified."" Congress gave no indication that rollovers
pursuant to Code section 402(a)(5) deserve more favorable treatment than
rollovers pursuant to Code section 408(d)(3). Accordingly, because Congress
enacted both Code sections 402(a)(5) and 408(d)(3) to enhance the mobility
of accumulated retirement funds, by analogy the legislative history of Code
section 408(d)(3) supports the principle that a taxpayer cannot utilize the
rollover treatment pursuant to Code section 402(a)(5), unless the taxpayer
receives the distribution from a retirement plan qualified in the year of
distribution. ' 9
Baetens v. Commissioner imports harsh consequences for Sixth Circuit
taxpayers.6 Under Baetens' strict interpretation of Code section 402(a), a
taxpayer who receives a distribution from a disqualified retirement plan will
lose the favorable tax treatment afforded by Code section 402(a).' 61 The
Sixth Circuit's decision clearly reflects Congress' understanding of tax laws
dealing with retirement plan distributions. 62 The practical effects of the
Baetens decision, however, do not reconcile with the broad policy of aiding
working individuals in accumulating funds for retirement that underlies the
federal tax laws that regulate retirement plans.' 63 The Baetens decision allows
the Commissioner to penalize innocent taxpayers, who have no control over
the management of a retirement plan, by denying tax advantages that the
innocent taxpayers anticipated in planning for retirement.'" This outcome
contradicts Congress' traditional policy to aid and protect workers in accu-
mulating funds for retirement needs. 65 The Sixth Circuit in Baetens noted
that the Baetens decision could produce fundamentally unfair results. '6 The
Sixth Circuit, however, noted that Congress, and not the courts, must change
the tax laws to remedy any inequitable consequences of the tax laws. 67
Congress should amend Code section 402(a) to remedy the inequitable
consequences that innocent taxpayers face upon retirement plan disqualifi-
158. Id. at 4807 n.17.
159. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text (discussing similarities between benefits
and congressional purpose of Code sections 402(a)(5) and 408(d)(3)).
160. See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text (discussing implication of Baetens v.
Commissioner).
161. See supra notes 6-15 and accompanying text (discussing favorable tax benefits provided
by Code § 402(a)).
162. See supra note 147 (Congress' understanding of tax laws regarding distributions from
disqualified retirement plans).
163. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing policy underlying development
of tax laws that regulate retirement funds).
164. See supra notes 67-68 (discussing inequitable results from strict interpretation of Code
§ 402(a)); supra notes 33, 42 (in Baetens, employer's actions, and not taxpayer's actions, caused
Commissioner to disqualify retirement plans).
165. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing policy underlying development
of tax laws regulating retirement plans).
166. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1167.
167. Id. at 1164.
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cation resulting from actions by employers. Because of the recently enacted
"top heavy ' ' 6 retirement plan requirements, disqualification of retirement
plans could become much more common.' 69 Furthermore, actuaries predict
that within forty years the number of elderly persons in the overall population
will increase by fifty percent.'7 0 Actuaries claim that such an increase will
reduce greatly the aid that the Social Security System will provide for retired
workers.' 7' Accordingly, retired individuals will have to rely more heavily on
funds from private retirement plans. Congress should modify Code section
402(a) to allow innocent employees, in the event of disqualification, to retain
the tax benefits associated with a qualified retirement plan when the employ-
ees have no control over a retirement plan's management and subsequent
disqualification. Congress, in enacting Code section 132, has adopted the
approach of allowing innocent employees to retain tax benefits when em-
ployers violate discrimination requirements.' 7 2 Code section 132 allows em-
ployees to exclude certain fringe benefits from gross income.'" Section 132
168. See I.R.C. § 416(g) (West 1985) (defining "top heavy" retirement plan as retirement
plan in which greater than 60% of present value of cumulative benefits represent cumulative
benefits of key employees). Section 416(a) of the Code allows the Commissioner to disqualify
a "top heavy" retirement plan. Id. § 416(a). An employer, however, can avoid disqualification
due to top heaviness by modifying the retirement plan to provide certain minimum vesting and
benefit payment provisions. See id. § 416(b) (prescribing vesting requirements that allow
employer to overcome "top heavy" classification and subsequent disqualification); id. § 416(c)
(prescribing requirements that allow employer to overcome "top heavy" classification and
related disqualification). Code § 416(b) provides that, if an employer allows 100% vesting within
three years or 100% vesting on a graduated basis over six years, then the Commissioner will
not disqualify the employer's retirement plan for top heaviness. Id. § 416(b). Code § 416(c)
allows employers to avoid retirement plan disqualification due to top heaviness when the
employer makes contributions on behalf of the non-key employees that exceed a minimum
percentage of the non-key employees' salaries. Id. § 416(c). See generally 3 J. RABKIN & M.
JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME GiFr AND ESTATE TAXATION § 15.04E (rev. perm. ed. 1985)
(discussing "top heavy" retirement disqualification and conforming amendments to avoid
disqualification); Bluestein & Levy, Owner-Dominated Plans-Top-Heavy PLans and H.R. 10
Plans, TAX MOMT. (BNA) 353, at A-2 to A-15 (1984) (discussing Code sections proscribing
"top heavy" retirement plans),
169. See Musick, TC Allows Partial Favorable Treatment On Distributions From Formerly
Qualified Plans, 62 J. TAX'N 134, 134 (1985) (new "top heavy" plan requirements threaten to
increase involuntary and inadvertent retirement plan disqualification).
170. See C. WEAVER, THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL SECURITY 181 (1982). Currently, 15% of the
United States population receives benefits from Social Security. Id. Actuaries predict that within
40 years 34% of the United States population will receive Social Security benefits. Id. at 182.
This change in the complexion of the age distribution in the United States will result in a shift
from 3.3 workers contributing to Social Security per beneficiary to 1.3 workers contributing to
each Social Security beneficiary. Id.
171. Id. at 176. Actuaries predict that the Social Security system will operate with a surplus
for about 20 years. Id. Within 30 years, however, the Social Security system should begin to
operate at a deficit. Id. By the end of 40 years, Social Security beneficiaries will have depleted
totally all Social Security funds. Id.
172. I.R.C. § 132 (West 1985).
173. See id. (Code § 132 allows exclusion from gross income for any fringe benefit which
qualifies as no-additional-cost service, qualified employee discount, working condition fringe or
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of the Code prohibits discrimination in the operation of such fringe benefit
plans. 74 When the Commissioner discovers such discrimination, however,
the Commissioner disallows the exclusion only to the extent that the fringe
benefit plan discriminates.'75 Accordingly, the Commissioner avoids the
unjust result of penalizing innocent employees who have no control over the
management of the fringe benefit plan. Disallowing tax advantages to
management but not innocent employees would remedy the present unjust
consequences of retirement plan disqualification. Moreover, the equitable
treatment of innocent participants of a disqualified retirement plan would
further Congress' traditional policy of aiding working individuals in accu-
mulating funds to provide for retirement needs.
76
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de minimis fringe). See generally McKinney, Certainty Provided as to the Treatment of Most
Fringe Benefits by Deficit Reduction Act, 61 J. TAX'N 134, 134 (1984) (§ 132 of Code legitimizes
employer fringe benefit programs that have valid business purposes and provides clear procedural
guidelines for Commissioner, employers, and employees); Shaller, The New Fringe Benefit
Legislation: A Codification of Historical Inequities, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 425, 429-32 (1985)
(Code § 132 attempts to eliminate Commissioner's favoritism toward specific industries by
codifying fringe benefit provisions available for all industries).
174. See I.R.C. § 132(h)(I) (West 1985) (discrimination results when employer offers fringe
benefits to officers, owners, or highly compensated employees on different terms from other
employees); see also H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1592 (Congress implemented
nondiscrimination provision in § 132 to prohibit fundamentally unfair result of allowing
employers to provide tax free benefits only to highly paid executives), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 697, 1216.
175. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 861 (Comm. Print 1984)
(when availability of fringe benefit program does not satisfy nondiscrimination rules, exclusion
still applies to employees who are not members of favored group).
176. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing policy underlying development
of tax laws regulating retirement plan distributions).
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